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The members of the American Law and Economics Association now number more than a thousand, and their work is done in
many different places and extends across diverse areas of the law.
Much of it, however, can trace its roots back to the University of
Chicago and a wonderful collaboration between Aaron Director
and Edward Levi. The two taught an antitrust course together,
and their efforts to synthesize traditional legal reasoning and the
principles of economics began the Law and Economics revolution
in earnest. This legacy of Director and Levi lies in oral history
and the work of their students, such as Robert Bork, John McGee,
and Ward Bowman, and the many who followed in their footsteps.1 Among them were four scholars, closely associated with
Chicago, who did much of the foundational work in Law and Economics.' Their roundtable discussion, published in this volume,
* The University of Chicago Law Review would like to thank Professors Gary S.
Becker, Ronald H. Coase, Richard A. Epstein, Merton H. Miller, and the Honorable Richard
A. Posner for their participation in this roundtable discussion. The Law Review also would
like to thank Dean Douglas G. Baird, Professor Kenneth Dam, Holly Davis, Chris Heiser,
Dan McGeehan, Christy Kosarek, Catherine Behan, and Chris Doyle for their assistance
with the planning of this event.
f Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Dean of The Law
School, The University of Chicago.
' The oral history is set out in Edmund W. Kitch, ed, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970,26 J L & Econ 163, 180 (1983).
2 Law and Economics, of course, owes much to other scholars as well. No list of central
figures in Law and Economics should omit Guido Calabresi, William Landes, Henry
Manne, or many others.
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provides a wonderful sense of the different paths that the discipline is now taking.
When discussing the mission of Law and Economics, Ronald
Coase often points to Ernest Rutherford's observation that science
is either physics or stamp collecting.' Physicists often begin by
asking questions that everyone else thinks too obvious. Newton
looked at falling objects; Einstein asked what he would see if he
were to travel away from an object at the speed of light. Similarly,
in Law and Economics, much is to be learned from simple questions. As different as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, Merton Miller,
and Richard Posner are from each other, they share a commitment to understanding the basic forces at work in our legal and
economic systems.
Gary Becker's work has explored many areas of life once
thought far removed from the domain of economics. By bringing
the tools of economics to them, he has provided rigor and insight
to fields that too often had neither. Becker's work on altruism,
human capital formation, and discrimination has become an integral part of scholarship on family and employment law.4 We who
teach law pride ourselves on our ability to push our students by
showing them how the simplest questions uncover what is rich
and interesting in law and life, but no law teacher has ever done
it as well as Gary Becker. For example, the way we now think
about deterrence in criminal law can be traced to a single day in
the 196_0s. Becker was late to a graduate student's oral examination. Tempted to park illegally, he was inspired to ask the graduate student to explain all of criminal law in economic terms. Not a
great moment perhaps for the graduate student, but a great one
for Law and Economics.5
After two years as an undergraduate at the London School of
Economics, a twenty-one-year-old Ronald Coase was awarded a
Cassel traveling scholarship.6 Coase took advantage of the scholarship to study the economy of the United States. He visited the
stockyards in Chicago and toured the great factories of the Midwest, including Henry Ford's River Rouge works. Coase saw both
markets and firms that worked with gree~t efficiency. This led him
to ask a simple question that had escaped others: Why do both
See R.H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J L & Econ 239,254 (1993).
See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Harvard 1981). Becker started his
work on employment discrimination well before lawyers discovered the field. See Gary S.
Becker, The Economicsof Discrimination(Chicago 1957).
' Becker sets out many of his insights in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
EconomicApproach, 76 J Pol Econ 169 (1968).
' Coase recounts his experiences in R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J L Econ & Org 3, 7 (1988).
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markets and firms exist at the same time? If markets are wonderful vehicles for organizing economic activity, there does not seem
to be any need for large firms. All production can take place
through the invisible hand of the market. But the opposite seems
equally plausible. If firms are splendid ways of organizing production, there does not seem to be any need for markets. Each country could become one giant factory. The field of transaction cost
economics grew out of the simple questions of why our economy
had more than one firm and why there were not an infinite number. Few senior theses have been as revolutionary as The Nature
of the Firm.7
For many years, Law and Economics has provided tools for
scholars interested in understanding the law regulating the capital structure of firms.' The simplest question one can ask about
capital structure is why a firm should have more than one kind of
investor. We see equity holders and many different kinds of creditors. Why should this be? Why should there even be debt and equity? Is an investor who holds debt more likely to be repaid only
because an equity holder is less likely? Merton Miller unraveled
this mystery with Franco Modigliani.9 Modern securities markets
can be traced to their insights. Option and derivative trading rest
solidly on the idea of put-call parity and in turn on the Modigliani
and Miller irrelevance propositions. ° Miller's work has led to trillions of dollars of economic activity. If he enjoyed even the smallest royalty from the use of his work in securities markets, he
would be the richest man in the world.
The use of assumptions in economics is perhaps the aspect of
the field that lawyers understand the least. Economists aim to
capture as much of the dynamics of behavior as they can with the
fewest possible assumptions. The question is not whether economists' assumptions are unrealistic, but whether they capture
enough of what is at work to allow us to see basic forces operating
in an otherwise impenetrable maze. The wonder of modern price
Coase's observations from his year in the United States gave rise to R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).

' See, for example, Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of CorporateReorganizations, 17 U Chi L Rev 127 (1950); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Eco-

nomic Structure of CorporateLaw (Harvard 1991).
' See Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am Econ Rev 261 (1958). For an overview of the
Modigliani and Miller irrelevance propositions, see Merton H. Miller, The ModiglianiMillerPropositionsafter Thirty Years, 2 J Econ Persp 99 (Fall 1988).
10 The seminal work is Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and
CorporateLiabilities,81 J Pol Econ 637 (1973). For an accessible discussion of the influence
of Miller's work, see Peter L. Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern
Wall Street (Free Press 1992).
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theory is how much can be derived from propositions that are so
simple. For example, once one accepts that, as a general matter,
demand decreases as price increases, much else follows. Graduate
students sometimes reduce all of microeconomics to only four
words-people maximize, markets clear.
Richard Posner's achievement was to use these same axioms
to illuminate the forces at work in the Anglo-American legal system. He laid bare the architecture of the common law by showing
how much of it could be derived from the axioms of economics.
The claim was never that only these mattered, but rather that
even by themselves they showed that the law had a logic and coherence that before we had only known intuitively. After Economic Analysis of Law, no one wrote about the common law the
same way again."
Law and Economics is now well into its seventh decade. It
has always renewed itself, has always remained at the cutting
edge, and has always kept first principles squarely in mind. Its
practitioners remain committed to physics rather than stamp
collecting. It is in that spirit that Gary Becker, Ronald Coase,
Merton Miller, and Richard Posner reflect on the future of Law
and Economics, under the strong hand of Richard Epstein, himself a formidable practitioner of the discipline.'

The Roundtable Discussion
RICHARD EPSTEIN: On this kind of occasion, there always
is a temptation to turn back to history. Quite by coincidence, the
other day Stephen Stigler gave me a sheaf of papers which included correspondence between Friedrich von Hayek and Henry
Simons. It contained a proposal for the creation of the Institute of
Political Economy at the University of Chicago. In describing this
program in a letter to Hayek, this is what our friend Henry
Simons wrote:
A distinctive feature of Chicago economics as represented recently by Knight and Viner, is its traditional liberal political
philosophy, its emphasis on the virtues of the dispersion of
economic power, free markets, and a political decentralization, real federalism for large nations and for supernational
n This landmark book, first published in 1973, is now in its fourth edition. See Richard
A. Posner, EconomicAnalysis ofLaw (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992).
' Among many other works, his foundational book on property remains required reading for everyone in*the law. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power ofEminent Domain (Harvard 1985).

